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Abstract: With the increasing importance of the inter-
net in our day-to-day life, data security in web applica-
tion has become very crucial. Ever increasing online 
and real time transaction services have led to manifold 
rise in the problems associated with the database securi-
ty. Attacker uses illegal and unauthorized approaches to 
hijack the confidential information like username, 
password and other vital details. Hence the real-time 
transaction requires security against web based attacks. 
SQL injection and cross site scripting attack are the 
most common application layer attack. The SQL injec-
tion attacker pass SQL statement through a web applica-
tion’s input fields, URL or hidden parameters and get 
access to the database or update it. The attacker take a 
benefit from user provided data in such a way that the 
user’s input is handled as a SQL code. Using this vulne-
rability an attacker can execute SQL commands directly 
on the database. SQL injection attacks are most serious 
threats which take user’s input and integrate it into SQL 
query. Reverse Proxy is a technique which is used to 
sanitize the users’ inputs that may transform into a data-
base attack. In this technique a data redirector program 
redirects the user’s input to the proxy server before it is 
sent to the application server. At the proxy server, data 
cleaning algorithm is triggered using a sanitizing appli-
cation. In this framework we include detection and sani-
tization of the tainted information being sent to the da-
tabase and innovate a new prototype. 
 
Keywords: SQL Injection, SQL Attack, Cross Site 
Scripting Attack, Data Sanitization, Database Security, 
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INTRODUCTION 
The data security is an important aspect to the organiza-
tions which are developing web applications. It is a 
great challenge to the organizations to protect their 
valuable data against intruders, corruptions and mali-
cious accesses. 
The main aim of database security is to provide 
the protection to the database from unauthorized access. 
The unauthorized or illegal action may execute the ma-
licious query; because of this vulnerability database 
security may break. Researchers have developed the 
Intrusion Detection System (IDS) for enhancing data-
base security against malicious access. Database secu-
rity can be categorized into external attack and insider 
attack. In external attack sensitive data is compromised 
by unauthorized attempts, whereas insider attack is exe-
cuted by an authorized user with the help of various 
malicious techniques.  
Attacks have increased as the large number of in-
formation systems are connected to the internet. SQL 
injection is one of the most serious security threats for 
web applications and databases. The attacker can submit 
a SQL query or command through the web application 
and can gain access to the underlying confidential in-
formation, by bypassing authentication [1] mechanisms, 
to modify the database and lead to execution of illogical 
code. This topic focuses on different types of vulner-
ability in database and the scheme used for detecting the 
Structure Query Language Injection Attack (SQLIA) 
and Cross Site Scripting attacks and prevention of the 
same using reverse proxy from the web applications. 
 
Webpage Connection 
 
The user (client) and the host (server) communicate 
through HTTPS in web-based applications. The process 
starts by entering the selected URL on the browser. The 
client permits one or more requests for accessing the 
web contents. The application server accepts the request 
and processes the same and then responds to the user 
with the web content. The information can be transmit-
ted by using multiple request/response within a single 
established connection session. The host performs fur-
ther processing of the user request and give related re-
sponse. The web page presented on the browser is the 
combination of all the related request/response, as 
shown in Fig. 1. The attacker sends the malicious action 
through the request or when server sends the response to 
the client by using certain features of the programming 
languages or the design of the browser. The attacks oc-
cur mainly because of entering, transmitting and com-
bining special grammars, malicious links, text strings 
Fig. 1 HTTPS and Web Page Connection 
etc. These attacks usually manage the original web pro-
cedure or server response.  
 
SQL Injection Attack 
 
SQL Injection Attackers include user data in the SQL 
query and arbitrary code is added in such a way that a 
part of the input is understood as SQL code. The attack-
ers [10] always use this malicious SQL codes for input 
fields of a web form to gain access and update the data. 
These types of vulnerability allow an attacker to flow 
commands directly to a web application's underlying 
database and destroy functionality or confidentiality. 
There are two techniques of SQLIA i.e. access through 
input fields and access through URL. In first technique 
attacker always bypass the authentication of user i.e. 
password. Attacker can perform this technique through 
multiple queries, extended stored procedure and ‘or’ 
condition etc. In second technique attacker manipulates 
the query string in URL. This vulnerability can be rep-
resented as: 
SELECT * FROM admin WHERE username = 
'admin123' AND password = 'secret' 
If in this query the attacker can enter [, , OR 
1=1– –] and [ ] instead of [admin123] and [secret], the 
query would take the form: 
SELECT * FROM admin WHERE username = 
'admin123' OR '1=1 – – ' AND password = ' ' 
Working of a SQL injection, as shown in the Fig. 
2, the condition equation of [1=1– –] and an empty 
password are mentioned in the query. After checking 
this condition equation and empty password, query 
would found a valid row in the table. An attacker may 
bypass all authentication measures, make changes to the 
database and gain unlimited access to the sensitive in-
formation on the server. Following are the various types 
of attacks: 
Tautology Attacks. The tautology attack always uses 
conditional statements to inject the code. This attack 
bypasses the authentication of the web page and extracts 
the important data. The tautological attacker exploits 
where clause in the query.  
SELECT accounts FROM users WHERE 
Login ='nil' OR 1=1---AND password = 'nil'  
The conditional statement (OR 1=1) transforms 
the where clause into tautology. The injected query re-
turns non null value that means the query is successfully 
executed. 
UNION Attacks. This technique is combine two que-
ries using UNION keyword. First query is original and 
second is injected query. In this attack with the help of 
original query injected query will retrieve the important 
data of the user. 
SELECT accounts From user WHERE login=' '  
UNION SELECT credit card WHERE  
accno=02220 – – AND Password=' ' 
The first/original query returns the null value and 
second/injected query returns the important data from 
the “credit card” table. 
Piggybacked Query. In this type of attack additional 
query will be added along with original query. The addi-
tional query is a injected query which is also called 
piggy-back onto the original query. Because of addi-
tional query database receives multiple SQL queries for 
execution. 
SELECT accounts FROM user WHERE lo-
gin='smit' AND pass=''; drop table user – – ' 
AND pin=231 
After executing the first query, database would 
find injected/additional query. The result of the above 
query is to drop the ‘user’ table and destroy important 
information.  
Blind Injection. In this technique, attacker asks true 
and false question to the server through the web page. If 
the injected statement evaluates to the true, the web site 
works normal. If the statement evaluates to false, al-
though there is no descriptive error message, the page 
differs significantly from the normal functioning page. 
Logical Incorrect Query Attack. This type of attack 
gathers important information about the type and struc-
ture of the back end database in the web application. 
When the attacker uses this logical incorrect query, the 
application server displays error page, which can serve 
to expose sensitive information about the databases to 
the attacker. 
SELECT accounts FROM users WHERE lo-
gin='' AND pass='' AND pin= convert (int,(select 
top 1 name from sysobjects where xtype='u')) 
The select query extracts the user table and then 
converts this table name into an integer. Because of this 
illegal conversion, database gives an error. In this tech-
nique, attacker has two useful tricks. First, the attacker 
can see that the database is an SQL Server database, as 
Fig. 2 Working of SQL Injection 
the error message explicitly states this fact. Second, the 
error message reveals the value of the string that caused 
the type conversion to occur. 
 
RELATED WORK 
Various techniques are proposed in the literature for 
intrusion detection and prevention. In this section, we 
brief on some of those techniques.  
A random token to SQL keywords and operators 
are appended in the application code by the SQLrand 
[3] technique. This approach creates randomized in-
stances of the SQL query language, by randomizing the 
template query inside the CGI script and the database 
parser. Here de-randomizing proxy is introduced to al-
low easy installation of their solutions into existing sys-
tems, which converts randomized queries to suitable 
SQL queries. A proxy server then checks to make sure 
that all keywords and operators contain this token be-
fore sending the query to the database. Because the SQL 
keywords and operators injected by an attacker would 
not contain this token, they would be easily recognized 
as attacks. The shortcoming of this technique is that the 
token can be easily guessed, making it ineffective, also 
the approach requires a special proxy server to be de-
ployed. 
In SQL Guard and SQL Check [8] and [9] que-
ries are checked at runtime based on a model which is 
expressed as a grammar that only accepts legal queries. 
An augmented grammar is used for detection of SQL 
injection attacks and marking mechanism is used for 
distinguishing malicious input. SQL Guard examines 
the structure of the query before and after the addition 
of user-input based on the model. 
CANDID [5] technique supply the programmer-
intended input query structure and identify attacks by 
comparing it against the structure of the actual query 
issued. Programmer intended queries are mined by dy-
namically evaluating runs over benign candidate inputs. 
This method is theoretically well established and is 
based on inferring intended queries by considering the 
representative query computed during a program run. 
CANDID's is very strong tool for detection of SQL in-
jection attacks. 
AMNESIA [7] combines static analysis and run-
time monitoring. In static analysis it construct model 
with the help of various type of queries which an appli-
cation can legally generate at each point of access to the 
database. Queries are intercepted before they are sent to 
the database and are checked against the statically built 
models, in dynamic phase. Queries that violate the 
model are prevented from accessing to the database. 
The most important drawback of this technique is that 
its success is dependent on the accuracy of its static 
analysis for building query models. 
The application SQLIDS [11] produces the in-
tended syntactic structure of SQL statements for secu-
rity purpose. SQL statements that do not conform to the 
specifications are considered as security violations and 
their execution is blocked. Specifications are most im-
portant in SQLIDS technique. Specifications are a set of 
rules which are used to illustrate the expected structure 
of SQL statement. Generally the application produces 
the SQL statement. The execution of original SQL 
statement is expected in the back end database and the 
specification is created by the syntactic structure Inter-
ception of SQL statements. The communication be-
tween the web application server and the data server is 
filtered and the SQL statements that are produced by the 
application are not transferred directly for execution to 
the database. This approach detects the injected SQL 
command by assumption. Therefore, if the intended 
structure of the expected SQL commands has been ex-
plicitly pre-determined, it is possible to detect malicious 
modifications that alter this structure. 
XPATH authentication Technique [2] is used for 
detection and prevention of SQL Injection attacks in 
database using web services. To detect and prevent 
SQLIA with runtime monitoring, without stopping the 
operation login page is redirected to their checking 
page. In this technique two modules are used i.e. Active 
Guard and Service Detector. The first module, Active 
Guard, is used as vulnerability detector to detect and 
prevent the susceptibility character and Meta character. 
Active Guard sends the validated user input to the Ser-
vice Detector. The user input is sent through the SOAP 
protocol (Simple Object Access Protocol) to the web 
service. The user input data is compared with 
XML_Validator. If the data is matched, the 
XML_Validator sets a flag value to 1 to Service Detec-
tor through the SOAP protocol and valid user can access 
the web application. If the data is mismatched, the 
XML_Validator sets a flag value to 0 to Service Detec-
tor through the SOAP protocol and invalid user can not 
access the web application. The second module, Service 
Detector filtration model is used to validate user input 
from XPATH_validator where the private data is stored. 
User input field compare with data existed in 
XPATH_validator if it is identical then authorized user 
is allowed for next processing. Web Service Oriented 
XPATH Authentication Technique does not directly 
allow to access database in database server. 
SQLProb [6] approach is fully modular. In this 
technique the extracted user input data in the context of 
the syntactic structure of the query can be evaluated. In 
this approach access to the source code of the applica-
tion or the database is not required. Also the system can 
be easily deployed on the existing enterprise environ-
ments and can protect multiple front-end web applica-
tions without any modifications. The SQL proxy-based 
Block (SQLProb) system has four main components i.e. 
the query collector, the user input extractor, the parse 
tree generator, and the user input validator. The query 
collector processes all possible SQL queries during the 
data collection phase, the user input extractor imple-
ments a global pair wise alignment algorithm to identify 
user input data. The parse tree generator generates the 
parse tree for the incoming queries. The User Input 
Validator checks the user input whether it is normal or 
malicious by using the user input validation algorithm. 
SQLProb is used in two phases i.e. the data collection 
phase and the query evaluation phase. In the data collec-
tion phase, user input validator collect the queries which 
cover all the functionalities of the application and save 
them in storage area. In the query evaluation phase, 
when a query created by the application is captured by 
the proxy, the proxy forwards it to the user input extrac-
tor and the parse tree generator simultaneously. Experi-
mental results indicated that high detection rate with 
reasonable performance overhead can be achieved mak-
ing the system ideal for environments where software or 
architecture changes is not an economically viable op-
tion. 
Detecting malicious JavaScript code in Mozilla 
[13] is a client side technique and uses Mozilla Firefox 
web browser. This approach focuses on developing an 
auditing system for JavaScript code execution for detec-
tion of anomalies and misuses in SpiderMonkey and 
Mozilla Firefox web browsers. The auditing system 
continuously monitors the implementation of JavaScript 
in these browsers. At the time of execution of 
JavaScript, various function retracts are registered in the 
JavaScript engine. These are used when a malicious 
script tries to access specific information that does not 
exist in the JavaScript engine. All the calls are inter-
cepted and logged by the auditing system. 
The multi agent scanner is used to detect stored 
cross site scripting attack vulnerabilities [14] in the web 
applications. Because of the multi agent architecture 
multiple agents can be able to operate the system inde-
pendently. The scanner does not require source code of 
the web application. The system has three modules – 
web page parser agent, script injector agent and verifi-
cator agent. Web page parser agent explores the injec-
tion point of stored XSS attack in the web site. The 
parsing process is analogous to that of the web crawlers 
and spiders, as it retrieves information from the web 
pages it visits and spreads through the web site follow-
ing the hyperlinks it finds. However, two of its charac-
teristics are distinct from the web crawler. First, it fol-
lows the hyper-links, targeting the scanned web sites 
and scrapping all external links. Second, the information 
recovered is web forms, which are entry points for 
stored–XSS attacks, as they are the main mechanism 
supported by the web application for adding new con-
tent which is continuously stored by the application. 
Links containing parameters are not stored as entry 
points as they are not used to insert new information but 
generally used to query the database used by the appli-
cation. They cannot be used for launching stored XSS 
attacks, but reflected XSS attacks. Script injector agent 
uses collection of web pages discovered by the web 
page parser agent. The different attacks get registered 
through the script agent in performed attack list. The 
agent injects a set of XSS attack vectors from a known 
depository into the different input fields of all the injec-
tion points. The set of attacks used for the evaluation of 
this tool are extracted from a depository of XSS attack 
vectors. These vectors make use of various ways of in-
jecting arbitrary scripts trying to be unobserved by the 
web application and to be included as valid content in 
the application. The next module is verificator agent, it 
uses the performed attacks list of script injector agent 
and analyses the application. This module corrects the 
input validation errors. The multi agent scanner scraps 
with the XSS vulnerabilities in the web application. 
Cross-Site Scripting Prevention with Dynamic 
Data Tainting and Static Analysis [15] proposed a pre-
vention of XSS attack. This technique uses the concept 
of dynamic data tainting. In this technique sensitive data 
is marked when scripts are running in the web browser 
and are dynamically recorded. When malicious data is 
being transferred to a third party, different actions can 
be taken, e.g., logging, preventing the transfer and stop-
ping the program with an error. Dynamic taint and static 
analysis module designed for recording the flow of sen-
sitive information in the web browser and intrusion pre-
vention against cross site scripting attack. When the 
sensitive information (e.g., user cookies) is about to be 
transferred to a possible attacker, the user has an option 
to decide to stop the connection. The Firefox based web 
crawler is able to simulate user actions. The process 
allows performing validation of different technique 
based on automatic browsing. 
 
PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR DATA 
SANITIZATION 
The block diagram of Reverse Proxy Model is illu-
strated Fig. 3. Reverse proxy server is placed in between 
the client (request) and the server (response). The client 
is not aware of the presence of the reverse proxy server. 
The Reverse proxy server hosts the sanitization applica-
tion for SQLIA and XSS attacks. This reverse proxy 
technique is used to sanitize the request from the user or 
client. The number of reverse proxies can be increased 
to handle the increased number of requests coming from 
the client, enabling the system to maintain the least 
possible response time even at very high loads. 
In Reverse Proxy System, clients can’t access web 
servers directly, and the client request must be for-
warded by the reverse proxy. There is an intrusion de-
tection and prevention mechanism embedded in the 
proxy. The basic functional requirements of the web 
intrusion prevention technique are to receive client re-
quests and server responses, analyse the requests and 
response messages, decrypt HTTPS messages, forward 
the safe messages and reject the dangerous ones, and at 
last log the client requests and detective results. The 
proxy with intrusion prevention is divided into different 
parts. First is the request listener, it listens to the ports 
of reverse proxy server in real time and receives client 
requests and server responses. Next is the data redirec-
tor which extracts the client requests and tokenizes 
them. All the tokenized parts are saved in a hash table. 
The tokenized query is then compared with the existing 
document. The query tokens are transformed into XML 
format. The attacks are matched with the URI parame-
ters of the HTTP header and the variable pattern is ex-
pressed by regular expression. 
Fig. 3 Block Diagram of Reverse Proxy Model 
 
The SQL injection preventer and Cross site pre-
venter analyse the client IP addresses. If attacks are en-
countered more than three times from a particular IP, 
the IP address is blocked for a pre-determined period 
and an alert e-mail is sent to the client; otherwise the 
request will be forwarded to the next module. The 
blocked IP list can be built not only by the system 
automatically but can be configured manually by the 
administrator also. The HTTPS request can be en-
crypted or decrypted between the client and the web 
servers. In order to cheat and cross the existing IDS, 
many hackers use various methods allowed by the web 
server to encode part of HTTP header or payload, such 
as URL encoding. Through the encode analysis, it’s 
easy to identify the content of SQL injection and XSS 
attacks. SQL injection preventer and Cross Site Script-
ing preventer modules are used to check the intrusion, 
and if attack action is found, client request is denied.  
The log module is used to log the client access 
requests, discovered attacks, privacy leaks and other 
system actions. Logs can help the administrators to ana-
lyse system performance, track and position the invad-
ers. 
Fig. 4 illustrates the block diagram of sanitiza-
tion application. HTTP request is forwarded to the 
proxy, which authenticates the request by sending it to 
the sanitization Application. The sanitization application 
is combination of SQL preventer and Cross site pre-
venter which is divided into two parts i.e. signature 
check and MD5 hashing. The sanitization application 
extracts the URL from the http request and separates the 
URL and user data. Then the URL and user data is 
parsed into token [12]. First, Signature check validates 
the URL by using regular expression and if any invalid 
character is found in the input query it is marked as ma-
licious and not forwarded to the next module. Only re-
quest which are reported as valid by signature check are 
forwarded to the next module. User data is parsed into 
tokens. These tokens are checked with the reserve SQL 
keywords and converted to corresponding MD5.The 
sanitization application filters the request for invalid 
tags and encodes it before forwarding to the server. 
Functionality of signature check and MD5 hashing 
modules is independent in a sense that the valid request 
goes to both the modules before getting executed on the 
web server. 
 
Fig. 4 Block Diagram of Sanitization Application 
 
IMPLEMENTATION 
The system implements new prototype version of re-
verse proxy server which prevents the SQL Injection 
Attacks (SQLIA) and Cross Site Scripting (XSS) At-
tacks. Java is selected for implementation as it is a plat-
form independent language, also during the literature 
survey we have observed that all types of SQLIA and 
XSS attacks were successes on the web application 
which are built using Java. This system uses simple web 
technologies like HTML, JSP (Java Server Pages), etc. 
This technique is fully automated. For user inputs we 
require a web application. Here we are using a banking 
application. As shown in Fig. 3, following three mod-
ules are implemented.  
 SQL Injection preventer 
 Cross Site Scripting preventer 
 Analysis Module 
The user sends the input through the login page 
of web application. The data redirector program, which 
is installed on the server gateway, gets the user input 
and redirects the request to the reverse proxy server. At 
the same time the data redirector encrypts the request 
into XML format. The reverse proxy server logs the IP 
addresses of the computers from where the request has 
originated. The reverse proxy server has the SQL injec-
tion preventer module and cross site scripting preventer 
module installed in it. The SQL injection preventer 
module validates the request against SQLIA and toke-
nizes the request. Various signature checks are carried 
out on the user request, like comments, white spaces, 
Meta characters, etc. If the special characters are not 
found in the user request then it is passed on to the cross 
site scripting preventer module. Cross site scripting pre-
venter module validates the request against XSS attacks 
by carrying out signature checks through the regular 
expression. This module prevents the forbidden tags and 
removes all unwanted and malicious code. 
The analysis module checks attacker’s activities. 
If the attacker attacks more than three times consecu-
tively the IP address of the attacker gets blocked for 
three hour. Also the account holder gets an email notifi-
cation and the account gets blocked for three hours.  
The analysis module can prepare the following 
reports  
(a) Attack’s List,  
(b) Blocked IP List,  
(c) IP Based Analysis and  
(d) Web Based Analysis. 
In the analysis of Attack’s List includes types of 
attacks, description of attacks, IP address of attackers, 
browser, URL, and timestamp. The blocked IP analysis 
includes IP address of attackers and number of attacks 
from a particular IP. In IP based analysis we observe 
User-ID, IP address, number of requests and time-
stamps. The web based analysis displays the browser 
name and count of attack. 
 
Fig. 5 The System Architecture 
 
Administrator’s Console: This interface creates a 
table on the basis of analysis done by the analysis mod-
ule. The table contains following attributes. 
 Attacker ID. 
 Attackers IP address which linked to view attack 
and IP base analysis module. 
 The login name or password issued to perform 
the attack. 
 Browser details that uses in attack. 
 Timestamp when the attack detects. 
Steps for Data Sanitization 
  
Fig. 5 illustrates the system architecture of reverse 
proxy. The client sends the request to the server, which 
is redirected to the reverse proxy server. The sanitizing 
application in the server extracts the request and sepa-
rates the URL from HTTP and the user data from the 
SQL statement. The URL is sent to the signature check 
where it is tokenized and checked through the regular 
expression. The user data is encrypted using the MD5 
algorithm. The sanitizing application uses SQL injection 
preventer and Cross Site Scripting preventer algorithm 
which sends the validated URL and hashed user data to 
the web application server. If the sanitization applica-
tion marks the URL request as malicious, the server 
denies the request. And if the sanitizing application 
finds the URL request benign, then the hashed value is 
sent to the database of the web application. When the 
match is found between the user data and stored hash 
value in the database, the user gains access to the ac-
count, otherwise the access is denied to the user. After 
completion of the process, the database response is re-
turned to the client and the subsequent request is 
fetched.  
 
Proposed Sanitization Process 
Input: User data and extracted URL from the HTTP; 
Output: Access to valid account 
SQL Injection preventer 
1. Take the user request. 
2. Parse the user request and store in the hash table and 
set a key value. 
3. The parse or tokenize request checks using signature 
check through the regular expression. 
4. If the tokenize request matches with 
AND_OR_Integer pattern discard the request. 
(AND_OR_Integer pattern checks the integer.) 
5. If the tokenize request matches with 
AND_OR_String pattern discard the request. 
(AND_OR_String pattern checks the string & and/or 
within single or double quotes.) 
6. If the tokenize request matches with SQL Statement 
Pattern discard the request. (SQL Statement pattern 
checks the SQL keyword.) 
7. Else call the installed Cross Site Scripting preventer 
program for checking XSS attack 
Cross Site Scripting preventer 
1. Take user request in the form of HTML text. 
2. Parse the request and store in the hash table. 
3. Check the parse request using signature through 
regular expression. 
4. If the parse request matches with the forbidden tag 
then discard it. 
5. Else remove the tags and encode the URL. 
6. If the parse request matches with the attribute tag like 
href, src and onclick remove that tag and encode the 
URL and push the tag in the stack. 
7. Else remove unknown tags. 
 
Steps for Proposed Sanitization Technology 
Step 1. Load the configuration in the system 
Step 2. The client forwards the request onto the server. 
Step 3. The request reaches to the reverse proxy using 
redirect program. 
Step 4. The sanitizing application process the request. 
Internally, the proxy server extracts the URL di-
rect from HTTP and naturally the user data from 
the SQL statement. The URL is sent onto the 
signature check through regular expression. 
Step 5. The user data (Using prototype query model) is 
encrypted using the MD5 hash algorithm. After 
that check whether is it a query. If yes, send for 
signature check otherwise send data to the cli-
ent. 
Step 6. The validated URL and hashed user data are sent 
by the sanitizing application to the server. The 
filter within the server denies the request in case 
the sanitizing application had marked the URL 
request malicious. In the event the URL can be 
found to become benign, then the hash value is 
send towards the database of this web applica-
tion. 
Step 7. When the hashed user data and the stored hash 
value in the database are matched, the user gains 
access to the account and the proxy server proc-
esses for next request. Else the access is denied 
to the user. 
 
Extraction of User Data 
 
As the client sends the HTTP request to the server at the 
same time SQL statement is extracted from the same 
request. After the extraction SQL query is tokenized. 
The tokenized query is compared with the prototype 
document. A prototype document includes all of the 
SQL queries that are expected from the web application. 
The tokenized queries are transformed into XML format 
[4]. The XSL’s pattern matching algorithm is designed 
to locate the prototype model equivalent to the received 
Query.  
XSL’s Pattern Matching: In this pattern matching 
algorithm, first query is analysed and divided into small 
elements. The query is first analysed and tokenized as 
elements. The prototype document stores and maintains 
the query pertained to the next particular application. 
The example of the input query is, SELECT * FROM 
employee WHERE login=‘admin’ AND password= 
‘XYZ’ OR ‘1=1’.When this query is received, it is con-
verted into XML format using a XML schema. 
Select * from employee where login =’admin’ and 
password=’XYZ’ OR ‘1=1’ 
 
Signature Check  
 
The signature check handles all possible methods of 
SQL injection attack through regular expression. The 
URL is extracted from the HTTP request and the URL 
is tokenized. The regular expression checks the small 
parts of URL. If the regular expression identifies any 
form of SQL injection signature then the request is 
marked as malicious else it is marked as benign. 
 
RUNTIME ANALYSIS 
We have evaluated effectiveness of our approach and 
compared with various other approaches. Table 1 indi-
cates various approaches/preventive techniques includ-
ing our approach and their effectiveness against differ-
ent categories of SQL injection and cross site scripting 
attacks. Our approach works for all approaches listed in 
the table. 
Query Representation into XML Format 
<Queries>  
<Query id=1>  
<command> select </command>  
<project_attribute>* </project_attribute>  
<From> employee </From>  
<LHS_condition> login </LHS_condition>  
<RHS_condition> string Literal </RHS_condition>  
<logical_operator> and </logical_operator>  
<LHS_condition> password </LHS_condition>  
<RHS_condition> String and Integer Literal 
</RHS_condition>  
</Query>  
</Queries> 
Table 1 Different Categories of Attacks used in Evaluation of Effectiveness 
 
Methodology Change in source code 
Detection 
/Mitigation of At-
tacks 
SQLCheck[8] Necessary Partially Automated 
SQLRand[3] Necessary Fully Automated 
AMNESIA[7] Not Necessary Fully Automated 
SQLProb[6] Not Necessary Fully Automated 
R_Proxy (Pro-
posed) 
Not Necessary Fully Automated 
Table 2 Analysis of Methodologies Curbing SQLIA 
 
Fig. 6 Comparison of Time required for Execution 
Table 2 indicates comparison between various 
methodologies with respect to whether changes are re-
quired to the source code for intrusion prevention. We 
also show in the table that our system is fully automated 
as compared to other partially automated systems for 
detection of attacks.  
We also evaluated execution time of proposed 
system for varying number of user requests. Table 3 
shows that the execution time required by the proposed 
system is much less than the existing techniques de-
scribed in [2]. 
Fig. 6 illustrates comparison between the execu-
tion time required by existing technique and the pro-
posed technique. The time required for execution is 
plotted on ‘X’ axis in millisecond and total number of 
user request on ‘Y’ axis. It can be clearly seen that the 
proposed technique requires much less time for execu-
tion as compared to existing techniques. 
 
Total User  
Requests 
Execution time in millisecond 
Existing Tech-
nique 
Proposed Tech-
nique 
100 46000 33000 
200 93000 14000 
300 46000 17000 
400 62000 23000 
500 78000 18000 
600 107000 20000 
Table 3 Execution Time Comparison 
 
Approach 
SQLIA XSS 
Tautology 
Logically 
Incorrect 
Query 
Union Query 
Stored Pro-
cedure 
Piggy-
backed query 
Stored 
XSS 
Reflected 
XSS 
SQLcheck[8] YES YES YES NO No NO NO 
SQLRand[3] YES NO YES NO YES NO NO 
AMNESIA[7] YES YES YES NO YES NO NO 
SQLProb[6] YES YES YES NO YES NO NO 
R_ Proxy (Pro-
posed) YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
CONCLUSION 
In this paper, various methods for detection and preven-
tion of SQL injection attacks and Cross site scripting 
attacks are discussed in brief. The goal of Reverse 
Proxy is to handle security issues. We have proposed a 
reverse proxy framework for intrusion prevention using 
sanitization technique. The Reverse proxy model is 
based on sanitization technique for discovering SQLIA 
and XSS attacks. The novel system with intrusion pre-
vention proxy is very effective in detecting and prevent-
ing the attacks from penetrating the web application. 
With the help of SQL injection preventer and Cross site 
scripting preventer, we are able to protect web applica-
tion against SQLIA and XSS attack. Reverse proxy 
technique is capable of preventing the malicious script 
without making any changes to the source code of the 
application. The analysis module make annotations the 
attacker history like IP address, timestamp, browser 
details, URL, etc. The analysis helps to make the system 
more efficient and flexible. Reverse proxy makes com-
munication between client and web server more secure 
and efficient. Thus, the user’s confidential information 
is protected while they perform any online transaction 
through internet. 
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